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STATEMENT 01: THE NATURE OF THE CASE
As part of a trust deed agreement, p] a :i i it :i f: E appellant

(hereinafter

j: iaymei its t ::> d e f e n d a n t

M a d s e n ) , makes
respondent

mon* ily

"budget"

(I ler * • I -a ' • -r P» .*dent : ,.t

Prudential accumulates such "budget" payments and maK* s
annual payments for- raxtu; ar 1 insurance*

consent

Prudential has mane substantial profits or .-*uch

investments.
imyjst;,

Prudential .;-**

Madsen

«•• i n t e n d s

en r iched

-

that

Prudential

has

been
,»ut J q e tfl

•

payments.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Madsen ^n^k-granting Prudential's IIK-LIV

••

jwei court's order

lot oQuinary judgment reversed,

,-^p-i the order denying Madsen *s motion for partial summary
u o ^ i V a : ; ! i. • >.'- •- o *:'::-. ^ •

.- •*

amount of the unjust enrichment arid

< H-

* v ^

!

C " «• >

•• * • r-T-

or further proceedings

on the class action issues consistent with Honorable

hrv&iit.

stayed t::- decision of -iran* in-j <-i o-nym-j class action
status until the question 01 iiabili^j *.i, decidual .

STATEMENT OF FACTS
During 1964, Madsen borrowed money from Prudential
for the purpose of purchasing real estate.

During the

closing and as part of the financing arrangements, Madsen
was required to sign a standard deed of trust prepared by
Prudential (Exhibit 1 to plaintiff's Complaint).

That

document contained a provision requiring Madsen to pay,
not only the monthly principal and interest payments, but
also to pay monthly 1/12 of the estimated annual real estate
taxes and insurance premiums into a "reserve" or "budget"
fund for insurance and taxes.

The language of the Deed of

Trust is as follows:
"A. To protect the security of
the deed of trust, TRUSTOR agrees:
2. To keep the buildings . . .
insured against loss by fire . . . ,
and to pay the premiums therefor promptly
when due . . .

4. To pay before delinquent all
taxes and assessments affecting said
property. . . .
"In addition to the monthly payments
as provided in said note, the TRUSTOR
agrees to pay to the BENEFICIARY, upon the
same day each month, budget payments estimated
to equal one-twelfth of the annual taxes and
insurance premiums; said budget payments to
be adjusted from time to time as required,
and said budget payments are hereby pledged
to the BENEFICIARY as additional security for
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the full performance of this deed of trust and
the note secured hereby. The Bu3get payments so accumulated may be withdrawn by the
BENEFICIARY for the payment of taxes or
insurance premiums due on the premises.
The BENEFICIARY may at any time, without
notice, apply said budget payments to the
payment of any sums due under the terms of
this deed of trust and the note secured
hereby or either of them. TRUSTOR'S
failure to pay said budget payments shall
constitute a default under this trust,1'
(Emphasis added^)
i- ,„ ,.he time

:-^ »

• .:

,

t h e y w e r e a w a r e o f t h e " e s c r o w " accouii wh . *;h <ii : not ;*ay
'->*-'

,

3 DUX. a i d n o t >,f" i f

s t a n d a r d p r o c e d u r e with m o s t lend^..:
had

* because

r

h i s *s a

.r .; .e

.

e.^-n

+-0 a g r e e \ > m a k e t h e me.nt-hly budq.?t p a y m e n t s for t a x e s a n d

- i.^ i*a.,

•

l

(Plaintiff's deposition a* «. ane -

* re f ise-1 financing,
iteu .\ iefendant's

memorandum supporting summary judgment at.
Q/xkr**

Thai

,)

I In1 i i •> j h I I emeu I ill n m

-ynwwifs f'ei t,iyps

and insurance is standard, p r o c e d u r e j .>.r .nust lending
tions is evidenced' u«- che federal regulations which
such b u d g e t paymer •_ -

institurequire

• *.<.•• ;.• .

p e r c e n t of value m a d e b y federal savings and loan a s s o c i a t i o n s .
»"-4r,

(

)

*•

' i.-.x\. J -"T-A

tj'jjis ce*J statutes t n a ^ compel
situations.
provici*

;V i other similar reaula«\ luinle i |»aymt

T h e Code o f Federal Regulations

specifically

• . : •
[FHA m o r t g a g e s ] shall p r o v i d e f o r
such equal m o n t h l y payments b y t h e
m o r t g a g o r to t h e m o r t g a g e e as w i 1 1
amortize •
t h e estimated amount ot
all taxes ai I :i fi re and o t h e r hazard
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"her

insurance premiums . . . within a period
ending one month prior to the dates on
which the same become delinquent."
(§203.19, C.F.R., 1971)
A Federal Home Loan Bank regulation states:
"A federal association may require
that an equivalent of one-twelfth of
the estimated annual taxes, assessments,
insurance premiums and other charges on
real estate security be paid in advance . . .
to enable the association to pay such
charges as they become due from the funds
so received. . . . "
(12 C.F.R. §545.6-11)
In addition, the Utah Code allows savings and loan associations
to require such budget payments as follows:
"The association may require that
the equivalent of one-twelfth of
the estimated annual taxes, assessments,
insurance premiums and other charges
upon real estate security, or any of them,
be paid each month in advance to the
association in addition to interest
and principal payments on its loans so
as to enable the association to pay
such charges as they become due from the
funds so received. The association shall
keep a record of the status of taxes,
assessments, insurance premiums and other
charges on all real estate on which the
association has made loans or which is
owned by the association." (U.C.A.
§7-7-5(a)(3)).
The Deed of Trust provides in paragraph 4 that
budget payments are pledged as security for performance of the
Deed of Trust, and that such payments are to be used by
Prudential to pay any amounts due under the Deed of Trust
including payment of taxes and insurance premiums.

Prudential

holds such "budget" payments for up to one year before the
taxes and insurance premiums are paid.
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Prudential engages

i

itqulat

the time

they

the taxes
< aintd

|)iln

and

are

( I

in P i u d e n l i a i , o

insurance

a j i . n l 1I

investment

of

i n v r f inq t h o s e

| i

"budget"

possession,

premiums a r e p a i d .

f iI

t h e Madsen

1i

)

I

"budget"

in

tunds

i.e.,

duiirn

b e J ore

Prudential

il I ui i z e d u s e

has

and

funds.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Prudential's

motion

mot J O

I ill

a n d Mads c n
1>V t h e

lower court

i i 1CM] II

fox
il

summary
iiiirn i ? ^

]udgment was
| ilqirtoni

on t h e 1 5 t h d a y c f Mai d i ,

notice ot

a p p e a l on t h e

UI

19 7 6 .

z~»th d a y o t

granted
I nied

Madsen

March,

197b.

POINT I
THE CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENT FOR DEFENDANT TU HOLD
"BUDGET" PAYMENTS CONSTITUTES A PLEDGE,
Ktiriqraph
plaintiff's

1

complaint,

iwi I
states

as

I

|

i I

attached

to

follows:

. . . said budget payments are hereby
pledged to the BENEFICIARY as additional
security for the full performance of this
deed of trust and the note secured hereby•
The budget payments so accumulated may
be withdrawn by the BENEFICIARY for the
payment of taxes and insurance premiums
due on the premises."
This language clearly creates a j ledqe.
instrument speciticaJJ

Not only does the

m i tin* M I ! pledge, I nf if liltill

the two iequirements of a pledge laid down by the U1 ih
SuprPH,

-Mjjf

903 (19t>i).

in Williams \

Esprey, li III tli >d 317, ^ 8 P. 2d

Those two requirements arc

I I tlu cxisttnr«

)t

a debt or obligation and (2) the transfer of personal
property to the pledgee to be held as security and if
necessary used for payment of the debt.
the Deed of Trust evidences a debt.

The language of

Moreover, neither

party to this lawsuit denies that defendants hold the
mortgage on plaintiff's property and that a debt is thereby
created.

The second element is met by the express language

of the Deed of Trust which states that the budget payments
are to be held as additional security for its performance
and that such payments may be applied against any amounts
due thereunder.
Where the language of a contract " . . . is clear
and is not susceptible of more than one interpretation, the
ordinary plain meaning of the words must be used."

Bryant

v. Deseret News Publishing Co., 120 Utah 241, 233 P.2d
355 (1951); See also, Jensen's Used Cars v. Rice, 7 Utah
2d 276, 323 P.2d 259 (1958).

Such is the case here as the

language quoted above and the discussion following that
quotation shows that the language of the Deed of Trust is
unambiguous in creation of a pledge.

In such a case, the

rule requires that the plain meaning of the words be used.
The plain meaning is that a pledge was created.
The law in Utah is clear that a pledgee who
uses pledged property without the pledgor's authorization
must account for any profits made because of such use in
absence of a contrary agreement.

Hoyte v. Upper Marvin Ditch

Co., 94 Utah 134, 76 P.2d 234 (1938); see also, Leggat v.
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Palmer, 39 Mont. 302, 102 P.2d 327, 329 (1909); Story on
Bailments, §331.

As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in

Hoyte:
" . . . when the property pledged is of
such a character as not to be lessened by
use, the pledgor does not incur liability
by using it, but if from the use of it
profits are derived, he must, in the
absence of special agreement, account for
them to the pledgor."
In the case at bar, no evidence can be found in the record
of an agreement allowing Prudential to keep profits made on
the escrow fund.

No evidence is in the record because no

such agreement, written or oral, was ever made.

Plaintiffs

did not agree nor does the Deed of Trust provide that
Prudential can even use the budget payments except as
security and for payment of amounts due under the Deed of
Trust.

Under the Hoyte doctrine, the absence of such an

agreement requires Prudential, as pledgee, to account
for profits made on the pledged escrow fund.
The rule stated above is also the one adopted
universally in the United States today.

See e.g. Thomas v.

Waters, 350 Pa. 214, 38 A.2d 237, 241 (1941); Manuf. Trust Co.
v. Bank of Yorktown, 282 N.Y.S. 507, 509 156 Misc. 793
(1935); State v. Nicely, 18 P.2d 503, 506, 171 Wash.
439 (1933); Restatement of Security §27 (1941).

That this is

the proper rule is evidenced by the fact that the Uniform
Commercial Code, which has been adopted by every state
except Louisiana, requires that any increase or profits on
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pledged property in the form of money must be remitted to the
debtor or applied against the debt,

U.C.C. §9-207,

The

comments under that section make it clear that it is a
codification of the common law.
Not only is this the clear weight of authority in
Utah and in the United States today, but the rule that a
pledgor is entitled to the increase of profits from the pledged
property has been a basic legal principal since ancient times,
I. A. Rocurek and J. S. Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and
Primitive Law 480, 481 (1915); Id, at 401, 4 S,P, Scott, The
Civil Law, 196 97 n.l (1932).

The Code of Manu promulgated

between 400 B.C. and 200 A.D, state that "the fool who uses
a pledge without the permission of the owner, shall remit
half of his interest, as a compensation for (such) use.1'
The same principal is embodied in the Code of Hammurabi which
is believed to be the oldest civilized code of law,

I.A.

Rocureck and J. S. Wigmore, Sources of Ancient and Primitive
Law, 401 (1915).
As evidenced by the above discussion, the rule is
universal that absent a contrary agreement a. pledgee who uses
pledged property must account to the pledgor for profits
made through such use.
fair and just result.

It is universal because it is the only
The pledgee has made his profit by

charging interest on the money loaned to the pledgee.

To

allow him to reap additional profits through use of the
pledged property would result in injustice.
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This is especially

true when, as here, the contract is one of adhesion and the
pledgor has no bargaining power to influence the matter.
Such a basic universally accepted principal of fairness
should not be overlooked by this court.
POINT II
IF THE COURT FINDS THE LANGUAGE OF THE DEED OF
TRUST TO BE AMBIGUOUS, IT SHOULD CONSTRUE SUCH LANGUAGE
AGAINST THE DEFENDANT DRAFTER.
If this court finds that the language of the
Deed of Trust is not clear but is susceptible of more than
one interpretation, it should find that the lower court
erred by not construing the contract against the drafter,
Prudential Federal, to find a contract of pledge.

It is

well established that Utah law requires an ambiguous or
doubtful contract to be construed against the drafter.
Wingets, Inc., v. Bitters 28 Utah 2d 231, 500 P.2d 1007
(1972); Skousen v. Smith, 27 Utah 2d 169, 493 P.2d 1003 (1972);
General Mills v. Cragun, 103 Utah 239, 134 P.2d 1089 (1943).
This is especially so when the contract is one of adhesion on
a printed form with blanks for the parties to fill in and the
drafter " . . . has the advantage of a lender of money."
General Mills, supra at 1094.

It is also true that the

drafter of a contract cannot later change its wording but
must accept and be bound to the words he chose.

Skousen v.

Smith, 27 Utah 2d 231, 493 P.2d 1003 (1973).
In the instant case, the Deed of Trust is a printed
form drafted by Prudential Federal Savings and Loan Association,

-g.

a lender of money.

Such facts require that the document be

construed against the defendant drafter.

This is especially

true in light of the fact that Prudential not only drafted
the form Deed of Trust but used its superior bargaining power
in requiring Madsen to sign it.

In such a case, Madsen

had no influence on the wording of the contreict.

The drafter

is most at fault in creating the confusion, and he should
likewise suffer the greater consequences.
The only way the Deed of Trust can be construed as
not creating a pledge is if Paragraph 4 is either deleted
or rewritten.

Such action is certainly not allowable under

Utah law, especially when the party to be benefited by such
revision is the drafter of the document who chose the very
language sought to be changed.

In Skousen, supra at 1005,

the Utah Supreme Court refused to delete the word "on" in
a contract and substitute the word "of" in its place at the
request of the defendant who drafted the writing.

The

court, at 1005, said it is ". . . elementary that parties
may be bound by the language they deliberately used in their
contract irrespective of the fact that it appears to result
in improvidence. . . . "

If the court would not allow deletion

and substitution of one preposition in Skousen, surely it
would be improper to delete or revise a whole paragraph in
the instant case so as to find something other than a pledge.
Prudential Federal chose the language of Paragraph 4 and
the lower court erred by granting it summary judgment and
not finding that a pledge exists between the parties.
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POINT III
IF THE COURT FINDS THAT A PLEDGE DOES NOT EXIST,
THEN A PRINCIPAL AGENT RELATIONSHIP IS PRESENT WHICH REQUIRES
THE DEFENDANT TO ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS MADE ON THE BUDGET
PAYMENTS.
The relationship between plaintiffs and defendant
is best characterized as a pledge because that is what
the Deed of Trust says it is.

However, the relationship

might also be described as one of agency.

In Continental

Bank and Trust Co. v. Taylor, 14 Utah 2d §70, 384 P.2d
796, 800 (1963), the Utah Supreme Court adopted the definition
of agency found in the Restatement of Agency 2d §1 by stating
as follows:
"Agency is the fiduciary relation which
results from the manifestation of consent
by one person to another that the other
shall on his behalf and subject to his
control, and consent by the other so to
act."
The court also said that the existence of an agency does not
depend on the payment of a wage or fee by the principal to the
agent.

In addition, it is recognized that an agency can be

created by conduct alone and no written agreement is
necessary.

Ramey v. Myers, 11 C.A. 2d 679, 245 P.2d 360

(1952); Anderson v. Thacker 76 C.A. 2d 50, 65, 172 P.2d 533
(1946).
The instant case falls under the definition
of agency found in the Continental case above.
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Under the

Deed of Trust Madsen is required to pay for taxes and
insurance.

Rather than pay these amounts directly, Madsen

turns over to Prudential each month 1/12 of the annual
amount for insurance and taxes.

Prudential is then bound

by paragraph 4 of the Deed of Trust to use the funds received
from Madsen to pay for insurance and taxes or other amounts
due thereunder.

Because Prudential is bound to use Madsen's

money in a certain way, an agency relation is established.
Note, the Mortgage Banking Process, 7 Houston L. Rev. 70,
85 (1969).

Madsen is the principal and Prudential is

the agent through whom the monies are transferred to third
parties.
Establishment of an agency relationship puts
obligations on the agent when dealing with the principal's
property.

One such obligation is that an agent who handles

his principal's property cannot keep any profits made thereby,
except for what he is entitled to in the way of compensation
for his services.

Adams v. Herman, 106 C.A. 2d 92, 234 P.2d

695 (1951); Savage v. Mayer, 33 CA.A 2d 548, 203 P.2d 9, 10
(1949); Steiner v. Rowley, 35 C.A. 2d 713, 221 P.2d 9 (1950)
This rule is stated at §388 of the Restatement
of Agency 2d as follows:
"Unless otherwise agreed, an agent
who makes a profit in connection with
transactions conducted by him on behalf
of the principal is under a duty to
give such profit to the principal."
Comment A to §388 makes it clear that an agent must give such
profit to the principal even if it was not received in violation
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of his duty or loyalty.
The above discussion aptly describes the situation
found in the present case.

Plaintiffs paid budget payments

to Prudential, not for Prudential's use but for the payment
of amounts due under the Deed of Trust.

In the capacity as

the plaintiff's agent, Prudential was bound to act in a fiduciary
capacity with respect to the funds held.
Agency 2d §13.

Restatement of

Because Prudential breached its fiduciary duty

as an agent by using the budget payments for investment
purposes without the principal's consent, the law requires
that Prudential turn such unfair profits over to their
rightful owners, the plaintiffs.
POINT IV
THE BUDGET PAYMENTS CONSTITUTE A SPECIAL DEPOSIT
REQUIRING DEFENDANTS TO ACCOUNT FOR PROFITS.
Additional support for the finding that Prudential
Federal should account for profits made through investment
of the budget payments can be found in the law of bank deposits.
Bank deposits fall into two categories —

general and special.

When money is deposited in a bank with no expressed intent
that a special deposit be created, the funds are deemed to be
held by the bank as a debtor to the depositor and the bank
can commingle the funds with its own assets and use them as it
wishes, 10 Am. Jur. 2d, Banks §§360, 364. No trust is
created as a ". . . debt is not a trust,*1
Trusts 2d:

Restatement of

Trusts §12. When money is left with a bank to
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be used for a specific purpose, such as payment of a
debt or transfer to a particular person, a special deposit
is created.

Id. at §366.

In such as case, " . . . the money

does not become the property of the bank.

The fund

is merely entrusted to the bank as a trustee or bailee."
Andrew v. Union Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 220 Iowa 712, 715,
263 N.W. 493, 497 (1935) Carpenter v. Suffolk Franklin Sav.
Bank, Mass, 291 N.E. 2d 609 (1973); McGregor v. First
Farmers'-Merchant Bank & Trust Co., 180 Wash. 440, 40 P.2d
144, 147 (1935); Engleman v. Bank of America Nat. Trust & Sav.
Ass'n, 98 C.A. 2d 237, 219 P.2d 868 (1950).
The latter law governing special deposits controls
the instant case.

Specifically, Madsen deposited money with

Prudential to be held for a particular purpose.

Neither

the parties nor the Deed of Trust disputes the fact that
the budget payments were held by Prudential Federal for a
particular purpose —

the payment of insurance and taxes or

other amounts due under the Deed of Trust.

Such facts created

a special deposit with Prudential as the trustee or bailee
and Prudential had no authority to use the funds as its own.
Andrew, supra.

Because Prudential Federal has violated its

duty by taking these specially deposited funds and investing
them, Prudential now owes Madsen an account for profits made
thereby.
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POINT V
DEFENDANT'S RETENTION OF PROFITS MADE ON ESCROW
ACCOUNTS CONSTITUTES UNJUST ENRICHMENT AND AS SUCH SHOULD NOT
BE ALLOWED.
The basic question in deciding whether defendant
has been unjustly enriched is one of fairness.

Applied to

the present case the issue is whether it is more fair to allow
Prudential Federal to retain the profits made by investment
of the budget payments or whether those profits should be
turned over to Madsen.

Stated differently, would Prudential

Federal be unjustly enriched if it were allowed to retain
profits made on money deposited for the payment of insurance,
taxes and other amounts?
The question above can be answered only by determining who is the owner of the profits.

Ordinarily,

profits belong to the one who expends efforts in earning them
or the one who owns the capital or property producing the
increase.

(That use of another's property entitles the

owner to a return is evidenced by rental payments made for
the use of property and by interest paid for the use of money.)
In this case, both are present.

Prudential Federal has

expended time and energy in administering the funds and it
should be paid for such efforts.

The owner of the funds

however should also be compensated for the use of his property.
As Prudential used their own expertise, time, and
effort in investing the funds, they should be compensated.
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As the property invested was owned by Madsen, he is
also entitled to be compensated.

The profit made is correctly

attributed to input received from both Madsen and Prudential.
Without both —

the property and the investment efforts —

no profit would have been earned.

The problem in this case

is that Prudential is attempting to keep both the profit
attributable to its managerial skills and the profit attributable
to the use of Madsen's capital for itself.
An illustration of the magnitude of the unjust
enrichment which lending institutions reap from investment
of escrow accounts is detailed in a law review note entitled
Lender Accountability and the Problem of Noninterest-Bearing
Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 56 Boston University Law Rev. 516,
533 (19 74)

The author of that note points out that despite

banking industry claims of no profits on escrow accounts,
an independent study by the Massachusetts Commissioner of
Banks indicates that banks in Massachusetts make a substantial
profit on such accounts.

Specifically, ". . . in 19 71,

the mutual savings banks collectively netted a profit of $4,000,000
and state cooperative banks earned close to a million dollars
in profits."

Id., at 5 35.

The unjust enrichment at issue

therefore is substantial as these figures illustrate.

And these

figures compose only the profits made for one year in one
state.

Certainly it is unjust to allow a practice which

enables lending institutions to make profits for their
relatively few shareholders at the expense of tens of thousands
of mortgagors.

This is especially true when overreaching,
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unequal bargaining power, and contracts of adhesion, unfair
in and of themselves, are the methods used by the lenders
which enables them to continue this practice.
As prevention against unjust enrichment, the court
should require Prudential to account for profits made through
investment of the escrow accounts and to pay Madsen the
profits attributable to the use of their funds.

Such relief

has been advocated by several commentators in this area.
Attack on Tax and Insurance Escrow Accounts in Mortgages, 47
Temple L.Q.

352 (1974); Lender Accountability and the Problem

of Non-Interest-Bearing Mortgage Escrow Accounts, 54 B.U.L.
Rev. 517, (1974); Payment of Interest on Mortgage Escrow
Accounts; Judicial and Legislative Developments, 2 3
Syracuse L. Rev. 845 (1972).
In fashioning the relief for unjust enrichment,
the court should remember that this is an equitable proceeding
and as such, the court has broad power to tailor relief to the
circumstances.

Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321 (1944).

If the Court determines that an accounting for past profits
would be too burdensome on Prudential, the least that should
be required is that profits on such funds should be paid
to Madsen from the date of this opinion forward.
The court is reminded that Madsen is not asking
for all of the profits made through investment of the
escrow account.

Indeed, Prudential is entitled to some of those

profits as compensation for administering and investing the
fund.

Madsen asks only for the profits which rightfully
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belongs to them.

This would include only the excess profits

or the unjust enrichment.

Madsen is aware that a decision

on how the profits should be split may require that this case
be remanded to the lower court for a determination of what
Prudential is entitled to in the way of a reasonable management
fee.
POINT VI
PRUDENTIAL'S ARGUMENT THAT A FINDING FOR MADSEN
WILL CREATE HAVOC IN THE BANKING INDUSTRY IS UNFOUNDED.
Madsen anticipates that Prudential will argue as
they did in their memorandum in support of their motion for
summary judgment that a finding for Madsen which requires
an accounting of profits made on these escrow accounts would
create more problems than it would solve and that it would
create havoc in and unduly burden the banking industry.
Such contentions are unfounded.

The Bank of America, the

largest banking institution in the world, announced some time
ago that it would begin paying the regular passbook savings
rate of interest on mortgage escrow accounts (less the bank's
cost of providing insurance and tax payment services) effective
January 1, 1976.
at 18.

Los Angeles Times, Nov. 27, 1975, Part 3

Bank of America also stated that its decision would

affect about 160,000 of its home mortgages.
"B of A to Pay Interest on Mortgage
Impound Funds in a major concession
to California consumer advocates,
Bank of America announced Wednesday
that it will begin paying interest on
home mortgage "impound" accounts —
the money banks and savings and loans
often collect from homeowners to pay
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insurance premiums and property taxes.
Beginning Jan. 1, 1976, the San
Francisco-based bank said it would pay
the regular passbook savings rate (currently
5% annually) on such accounts, less the
bank's cost of providing insurance and
tax payment services.
A spokesman for Bank of America said
the service costs 'should run about 1%,
leaving the homeowner with a net interest
gain of approximately 4%.'
Bank of America would be the first
major state lender to pay interest on
impound accounts, although a number of
large banks and savings and loan associations are known to have been considering
such a move for many months.
'We've been looking at it for quite
a while,' said an official with a rival
California bank, 'and I know most of the
other big banks have, too. Now that Bank
of America has done it, I wouldn't be
surprised if most of us followed suit pretty
quickly.'
A number of consumer groups and state
politicians have been urging banks and
S&Ls to pay interest on impound accounts
for several years, charging that the lenders
benefited unduly from the use of their
customers' funds.
Two separate pieces of legislation that
would require banks and S&Ls to pay
interest on such accounts currently are
being considered in Sacramento.
In announcing its decision Wednesday,
Bank of America said about 160,000 of
its home mortgage accounts would be affected
by the upcoming change, including FHA and VA
loan accounts for which the collection of
funds in anticipation of property taxes and
insurance premiums is required by law.
Spokesmen for two large savings and loans
in the Los Angeles area said they were
'surprised' by Bank of America's announcement. They said their firms would now be
forced to consider similar plans."
If Bank of America can accommodate a policy change affecting
160,000 mortgages, certainly Prudential Federal can accomplish
a similar change when only 20,388 mortgages are involved.
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(p. 7 of defendant's Memorandum in Support of its Motion
for Summary Judgment).
Moreover, the New York statutes were amended in
19 74 to require all banks within that state to pay interest
on mortgage escrow accounts effective April 1, 19 74.
McKinney's Consolidated Laws of New York, Banking Law §14-b
(1974 Supp.).

The state of New York which contains the

greatest number, dollar wise, of banking institutions in
the world has been requiring its banks to pay interest on
mortgage escrow accounts for over two years and no great
calamity has resulted.
can be done in Utah.

If it can be done in New York, it
Furthermore, bank trust departments

routinely account for profits made on funds expressly held
by them in trust.

It should be no greater burden to require

them to do so with mortgage escrow accounts.

Defendants

cry of hardship is therefore unfounded as other banking
institutions have been able to account for such profits.

1. Other states also require payment of interest on
escrow accounts and the banks involved have been able to do
so without serious effects. See, Gen Stat of Conn. §33-10
(1975); A . C M . §183:61; see also, Tierney v. Whitestone
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 77 Misc. 2d 284, 353 N.Y.S. 2d 104, 110
(Civ. Ct. Queens Co. 19 74) where it is stated that similar
legislation is expected to be adopted in Oregon, Minnesota,
N. Carolina, Michigan, and Virginia.
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POINT VII
PRIOR CASE LAW IN THIS AREA IS NOT CONTROLLING HERE,
The issue of whether a mortgagee's collection of
impound accounts for insurance and taxes in connection with
monthly mortgage payments imposes a duty upon the mortgagee
to pay interest or account for profits made on such accounts
has been the subject of increased litigation.

See Carpenter

v. Suffolk Franklin Savings Bank, Mass,, 291 N.E, 2d 609 (1973);
Buchanon v. Brentwood Federal Savings & Loan Assfn,, 457 Pa,
135, 320 A.2d 117 (1974); Abrams v, Crocker-Citizens National
Bank, 41 Cal. App. 3d 55, 114 Cal, Rpt. 913 (1974); Surrey
Strathmore Corp. v. Dollar Savings Bank, 36 N,Y, 2d 173, 325 N.E,
2d 527 (1975); Brooks v. Valley Natyl Bank,

Ariz.

, 539 P.2d 958 (1975); Zelickman v. Bell Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 13 111. App. 3d 578, 301 N.E. 2d 47 (1973); Sears
v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 1 111. App. 3d 62, 275 N.E.
2d 300 (1971).

The reason for the increased litigation in this

area is very well stated by the following quote:

"The concept of setting aside a prorata share of annual tax and insurance
costs each month in a separate account
arises from the experience of lenders
during the depression of the 19 30fs, when
many people lost their homes in tax foreclosures. In order to make mortgage loans
more attractive to lenders, the Federal
Housing Administration made escrow accounts
mandatory on all FHA-insured mortgage loans.
At that time, interest rates paid on
savings accounts were so low - around 1
or 2 per cent - that no thought was given
to payment of interest on escrow accounts.
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In fact, some lenders charged an extra
fee for handling the accounts. Over the
years, the prepayment of tax and insurance
payments into escrow accounts that bear
no interest became established practice
within the lending industry, not only
for government-insured loans, but for
conventional mortgage loans as well.
But times have changed, passbook
interest rates are no longer at 1 per
cent. The amount of money held in savings
accounts is at an all-time high and the
problem of tax foreclosures today is
nowhere near what it was in the 19 30's.
As for the escrow funds lenders hold,
it has become an accepted practice for
many lenders to commingle these funds
with other money invested for profit.
Thus, the lenders have become accustomed
to substantial income from the investment
of mortgage borrowers' escrow funds,
and seldom do they share those earnings
with the people who own the money.
There are no national figures to show
how much mortgage lenders earn from the
interest-free use of escrow money, but
a study of Prof. John A. Spanogle, Jr.,
of the University of Maine School of Law,
estimates it at $100 million a year."
"Homeowners v. Lenders - a Question of
Interest", 38 Consumer Report 202 (1973).
Some, but not all, of the cases in this area have
been decided adversely to the mortgagors.

Plaintiffs anticipate

that Prudential will rely heavily upon the following cases
cited by Prudential to the lower court.

Brooks v. Valley

National Bank, 539 P.2d 958 (Ariz. 1975); Zelickman v. Bell
Federal Savings, 301 N.E. 2d 47 (111. 1973).

Madseft admits

that a few cases have been decided in other jurisdictions which
have considered similar issues and that such cases appear
to support Prudential's position.

Madsen, however, suggests

that the court view Prudential's authorities from the following
perspective:

-22-

)

The highest court of a state is not bound
by the decisions of other state courts but can
choose to reject them all or accept and apply
the reasoning which it feels best states the
law.

Ashton-Jenkins Co, v, Bramel, 56 Utah

587, 192 P, 273 (1920),
It is not even bound to accept the reasoning
having a numerical majority.

This is especially

true when the issue involves a new and unsettled
area of the law and the courts which have considered the matter are not in agreement,
)

The cases favorable to Prudential's position
are not controlling here as they all turned
on the issue of a trust, Brooks at 961, and did
not discuss the legal theories of pledge and
agency which Madsen argues here.

Indeed,

Madsen is not even asking the court to decide
the existence of an express trust,
)

The primary issue before this court is the
construction and interpretation of the Deed of
Trust or contract between the parties. No
court has ever considered the specific language
contained in the Deed of Trust before this
court.

Only one case has been located which

even contained a Deed of Trust with similar
language, Zelickman v% Bell Fed, ,Sav« and Loan
Ass'n, 301 N,E. 2d 47 (111, 1973) and that court
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did not discuss the pledge theory.

In

accordance with the strong policy favoring
freedom of contract, this court should not
look to cases from other jurisdictions involving
similar facts but different contract language.
Instead, it should focus on the language of
the Deed of Trust before the court.
CONCLUSION
The language of the Deed of Trust creates a common
law pledge.

Even if the language is ambiguous, it should

be construed against the drafter, especially in a contract
of adhesion.

Since the "budget" funds were held by Prudential

in pledge, Prudential must account to Madsen for any profit
or increase which Prudential has earned by unauthorized
use of the fund.

This same result would prevail under the

law of agency or banking fairness and equity demand that
Madsen share in the profits which Prudential has earned by the
unauthorized use of Madsen!s property.
lower court should be reversed*
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The ruling of the

